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mAbstract
This paper analyses the debate which has unfolded in the Baltic Sea Region
regarding the reduction of sulphur content in vessel fuels, in order to illustrate how
tightening environmental regulation challenges traditional forms of maritime
governance. Using an interactive governance approach, this study reconstructs the
process of sulphur emission reduction as a complex multi-stakeholder interaction in
multiple contexts. The empirical investigation has drawn on documentary material
from around the Baltic region, including Russia, and has applied the method of
qualitative content analysis. The empirical study focuses on two interlinked
questions: (1) How sulphur emission reduction policies are being anticipated by
maritime industry, in particular by Baltic ports and (2) How port adaptation strategies
are tied into Baltic local and energy contexts. Addressing these questions highlights
the role of polycentricity in shipping governance and explains how the same
universal international regulations can produce varying patterns of governance. The
paper concludes that policy-making shall take an account of the fact that the
globalized shipping industry is nevertheless locally and sectorally embedded.
Keywords: Port; Maritime governance; Polycentric; Air pollution; Baltic Sea regionIntroduction
Environmental concerns have a growing strategic importance for maritime transport
and ports (Darbra et al. 2009; Hall and Jacobs 2010). Even though shipping is a late-
comer in environmental matters compared to many other industries, the tightening
regulation and pressures from the end customers to diminish the environmental bur-
den of the entire transport chain have changed the mind-set of the maritime transport
sector (Lai et al. 2011). This paper focuses on air emissions of shipping, in particular
the debate regarding reducing the sulphur content in vessel fuels to illustrate how
tightening environmental regulation challenges traditional maritime governance forms.
Even though vessels’ air emissions are not the only negative environmental externality
of commercial shipping, the rising energy costs, the need to cut harmful emissions to
the environment and to increase the energy efficiency of the vessels has put the air
emissions and energy question in the spotlight. The reduction of air emissions from
shipping has been a hot topic in the maritime industry for over a decade, but with the
entry into force of the amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annex VI “Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships”
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North Sea, as well as the English Channel to Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs),
its acuteness has become evident. The debate about controlling vessel emissions re-
flects a wider shift of power from flag to port states (Roe 2013), the changing role of
the ports in global transport and value chains (Olivier and Slack 2006), and political
tensions regarding energy security (Aalto 2008). Previous research has addressed the
technical side of emission reduction, focusing mainly on vessels (Endresen et al. 2003;
Eyring et al. 2005; Corbett et al. 2009; Wahlström et al. 2006; Balland et al. 2013),
whereas the socio-political side of emission reduction in shipping, in particular the role
and stakes of actors and polycentricity have been investigated far less (Roe 2008, 2009;
Ostrom 2012; Bloor et al. 2013). Moreover, emission reduction in shipping has not been
treated as an energy policy issue, even though uncertainties regarding fuel supply, dis-
tribution infrastructure and prices of fuels form the core of the matter for the shipping
industry. We use the case of sulphur oxides (SOx) emissions in the Baltic Sea Region
(BSR) in order to put these issues under social scientific scrutiny.
The study aims at reconstructing the process of SOx emissions reduction in the BSR as
a complex multi-stakeholder interaction by tracing the actors’ engagement in SOx emis-
sions reduction policies in multiple contexts by using interactive governance approach
(Kooiman 2003; Kooiman et al. 2008). It focuses on two interlinked empirical research
questions: (1) How SOx emission reduction policies are being anticipated by maritime in-
dustry, in particular by Baltic ports and (2) How port adaptation strategies are tied in with
Baltic local and energy contexts. The empirical investigation draws upon documentary
material and applies the method of qualitative content analysis (Gläser and Laudel 2009).
The sources used consist of materials from around the Baltic region, including Russia.
Recent literature has emphasized the need for stronger empirical maritime govern-
ance, in particular focusing on uncovering the failure of hierarchical regulatory govern-
ance of shipping negative externalities and researching the practical impact of
institutions (Ng et al. 2013). Acknowledging this need, this research aims to contribute
to the discussion on maritime governance through a thorough empirical investigation
which emphasizes why polycentricity needs to be taken into account when shipping is
concerned. Taking into consideration the trans-boundary and globalized character of
shipping industry, the paper aims to explain how the same universal international regu-
lation produces varying governance patterns. The key argument is that globalized ship-
ping industry is nevertheless locally and sectorally embedded.
The structure of the paper is as follows: “Interactive governance approach and mari-
time governance” section introduces the interactive governance approach, "Data and
method" section presents data and methods, "Analyzing governance: empirical research
strategy" section explains the analytical strategy and operationalisation of the govern-
ance approach, "Case-study: Baltic ports in vessel SOx emission reduction" section
elaborates on the analysis and its results, "Baltic ports: adapting to a complex environ-
ment" section discusses the results in the light of interactive governance approach, and
"Conclusions" section concludes.
Interactive governance approach and maritime governance
Governance is a complex notion which allows for multiple interpretations. It has been
conceptualized and analyzed as interaction (Kooiman 2003), multi-dimensional policy
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instruments (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007), dynamics between the structure and
process (Börzel and Risse 2010), and discourse (Hajer 1995). Here we follow the inter-
active governance approach as elaborated by Kooiman (1993, 2003), which is based on
the assumption that ‘societies are governed by a combination of governing efforts’
(Kooiman et al. 2008:2) which reflect the multiplicity of societal responses to modern
challenges. The interactive governance approach focuses on the occurrence of
governing interactions “at different societal scales, from the local to the global and
with overlapping, cross-cutting authorities and responsibilities” (Kooiman et al.
2008:2). It views governance as a variety of horizontal networks, as well as vertical
arrangements between public and private entities (Kooiman 2003; Kooiman et al.
2008; Torfing et al. 2012).
One of the key strengths of interactive governance is its attention to polycentricity,
which raises questions of how power is being exercised by actors located at different
places and jurisdictional levels, and how multiple centers of decision making independ-
ent of each other can coexist (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 2010). Polycentric insti-
tutional structures enable addressing environmental problems at multiple scales
and in dynamic environments where adaption to change and uncertainty is crucial
(Galaz et al. 2008; Moss 2012). In policy studies, an interactive governance ap-
proach has also been applied to clarify collaborative policymaking and participatory
processes, “whereby government involves its citizens, social organisations, enter-
prises and other stakeholders in the early stages of public policymaking”
(Edelenbos 1999, 2004:111). Thematically, interactive governance has most widely
been applied to the study of river and water management (e.g. Moss 2004; Jentoft
2007; Edelenbos et al. 2010).
The study of the maritime emission reduction debate within an interactive govern-
ance perspective draws the researcher’s attention to (1) the multiplicity of actors, whose
number, positions and other intrinsic characteristics are subject to empirical verifica-
tion, rather than a theoretically predefined parameters; (2) the variety of governing in-
teractions, where a set of allowable actions and their outcomes are constrained by
conditions both internal and external to the process under scrutiny; (3) the role of both
formal and informal institutions in structuring the process. An actor is defined as “a
single individual or a group functioning as a corporate actor” (Ostrom 2011:12). In the
process of social interaction, externalities may occur if some actors do not find it in
their interest to take account of the consequences of their actions on others (Buchanan
and Stubblebine 1962). Essentially, externalities point out to divergence between private
and social costs. Institutions are regarded as ‘rules of the game’, representing formal
rules and compliance procedures as well as agreed operating practices (informal rules)
that structure the relationships between actors and socio-economic structures (North
1990; Scharpf 1997; Ng et al. 2013). Institutions influence actors’ decision making. The
context is the set of regulatory, technological, social, political, environmental, territorial
and economic conditions, in which the governance process takes place. Positionality re-
fers to an actor’s relational position to space and time (Sheppard 2002). The interactive
governance approach thus offers a framework for grasping the complexity of socio-
political interaction in the emission reduction debate by focusing on how new forms of
governance combine with traditional institutions and policy processes and how private
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process of governance restructuring. The analysis focuses on actors who are involved,
their strategic interaction, the multiple interconnected contexts in which interactions
are embedded, and how institutions structure the interaction.
Within maritime governance, the interactive governance approach is valuable in
uncovering inconsistencies regarding interactive mechanisms, in particular by drawing
attention to the interaction between the governing system and the subject-matter of
governance (Kooiman 2003; Torfing et al. 2012). Tan (2006), Roe (2009, 2013),
Marsden and Rye (2010) have shown that traditional forms of maritime governance
which rely on nested hierarchies are ill-suited to integrating environmental concerns.
However, the creation of governance structures capable of reducing the negative im-
pacts of maritime transport is not an easy process, as the emission regulation case of
this paper demonstrates. In maritime transport, as in other multi-stakeholder environ-
ments, the regulation and management of environmental externalities often faces the
ambiguities of governance architecture, creating situations in which small-scale prob-
lems are being approached from higher levels and attempts to tackle global problems
are being undertaken at the lowest levels (Young 1994), thus creating problems of ‘fit’.
A mismatch between the geographical extent of the emissions to be reduced and the
territorial scope of the several institutional layers regulating maritime transports is not-
able in the case of sulphur emissions. Furthermore, a misfit between governance
process and structure, differing understandings of the emission problem, limitations of
available solutions and the actors’ capabilities to fulfill the requirements further compli-
cate the situation.
Data and method
This study consists of an analytical investigation of governance changes brought about
when new practices emerge in the industry, facilitated by new forms of regulation and
a growing demand for higher environmental quality. The study is based on an analysis
of qualitative data, carried out in order to explain how the ongoing process of air emis-
sion reduction in shipping changes maritime governance, especially with regard to
shifting the position and action strategies of the ports. The data used stems from mul-
tiple sources: conference and seminar presentations, publicly available policy docu-
ments, industry statements (open letters, resolutions, press releases), news and
statutory documents. Complementary to the ‘desktop study’ (Wheeler and Peszynska
2002), primary data was generated by the other author via participant observation and
personal communication with maritime stakeholders in three events held in 2011–
2012: 1) the Baltic Ports Conference Rostock, Germany 2011 (Baltic Ports Organization
2011), 2) the PENTA project workshop ‘Major shifts or business as usual? Implications
of sulphur regulation on maritime transport’ held at Muuga, Estonia on 18.4.2012
(PENTA 2012), and 3) the CLEANSHIP Mid-Term Conference in Riga, Latvia 2012
(CLEANSHIP 2012). Various presentations in these events dealt with the policy process
of the SOx regulation, estimates of how emission regulation will affect maritime trans-
port flows and technology and how ships can comply with the regulations. By observing
the discussions it was possible to obtain information on the reactions of the ports to-
wards the emission regulation. This data in the form of field notes was used to comple-
ment written sources. In addition to the published and unpublished primary material,
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collected simultaneously (2012–2013). The mixed character of the data is a part of
the complementary research design implemented in this study. Since any given
type of data can give only certain kind of information, a combination of different
types of data allows them to complement each other (Brewer and Hunter 2006;
Small 2011).
The qualitative analysis of the content was chosen as the central data analysis method
and was applied coherently to all primary data generated in course of research (Gläser
and Laudel 2009). The primary aim of the analysis is to look for mechanisms which
can account for unfolding events observed in the data, and to clarify if the propositions
created on the basis of governance theory are mirrored in stakeholder debates; i.e. if
other actors and the ports themselves acknowledge their changing role in maritime
governance. Technically, this method of analysis consists of the two distinct steps: data
compression and pattern recognition. Firstly, the data collected for analysis is com-
pressed in a tabular form in accordance with categories which can be viewed as ‘con-
tainers’ for meanings, deductively derived from the theory. Though the extraction
process is theory-guided, it remains open to the new concepts emerging from the data.
The dimensions of potential interaction to be explored are the subject of interaction
with the nature of the situation and the scope of the included actors. In the extraction
tables, the information is summarized for theoretical reasons, so that the background
cases (units of observation) are left in the background, whereas the information is pre-
served. Information with the same meaning is aggregated, whereas contradictory infor-
mation is kept for further in-depth investigation. Thus, single units of analysis data are
aggregated into larger units (referred to as variables or categories) at a more abstract-
theoretical level, which allows subsequent analysis. During the analysis of extracted infor-
mation, attention is paid to patterns in the data, in particular (1) Sequences of events that
occur more than once, (2) Combinations of conditions, processes or outcomes that occur
more than once; (3) Conflicting accounts of events or processes. Pattern recognition is
thus the second step of the analysis. Once patterns are identified, the results of the ana-
lysis can be visualized and presented in form of graphical displays, which are used to both
describe and explain the patterns in the data (Miles and Huberman 1994). The extensive
use of graphical displays firstly allows for the reduction of the data by selecting and
transforming it through summarizing the argumentation lines, and secondly, reinforces
the validity of research by assembling information contained in lengthy qualitative data in
accordance with clear-cut rules (Miles and Huberman 1994:11). Finally, the construction
of displays plays a substantial role in deductive qualitative analysis, not only by helping to
organize the material, but also by adding an analytical level to the interpretation of the
data and by transferring it a certain level of abstraction.
Analyzing governance: empirical research strategy
The interactive governance approach offers a broad and inclusive framework well-
suited to grasping the complexity of contemporary socio-political interaction in the
field of public policy. The interactive approach to governance provides a researcher
with the following conceptual guidelines: encouragement to look for actors and focus
on their interactions in multiple institutional contexts (in which the interactions are
embedded), as well as paying attention to how these contexts are interconnected
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the data sources were used to extract information on the actors and the institutional
contexts in which they interact, as well as the relationships between the actors and the
contexts. Key questions included: Which actions are pursued, announced, desired,
rejected, and intended? How is the modus of action embedded in contexts?
For the purpose of empirical investigation, the theoretical concepts introduced
in "Interactive governance approach and maritime governance" section were
operationalised in the following way. An actor is described in two dimensions:
type (individual, institution, public, business etc.) and position, in regard to
governing interaction (rules demanders, suppliers and targets). In relation to ac-
tion, the category of actor is seen as empirically opened up. Thus, any actor who
acted in regard to the policy problem was regarded as relevant. Institutions are
operationalised with the grammar of institutions developed by Crawford and
Ostrom (1995). They distinguish between three types of institutions: rules, the
most prescriptive and formal type of an institution; norms, which are also pre-
scriptive but are not presupposing any formal punishment for non-compliance;
and strategies, which do not contain normativity but rather describe common
communication patterns. Institutional statements can be described in three dimen-
sions: the subject of institutional statement (what is regulated), its content (how it
is regulated), and scope (to whom it is applied). The elaboration of these three di-
mensions allows for depicting the interconnectedness of actors and institutions by
showing how spatial and institutional contexts, related to regulatory, technological,
social, political, economical, and environmental elements, affect actors’ behaviour.
Institutional contexts exist simultaneously and overlap, thereby enabling some
actions and putting constraints on others. Eventually, in relation to action, institu-
tional contexts are characterized by two dimensions - opportunity and challenge -
which describe the perceived influence of the ‘rules of the game’ on the potential
outcomes of the process.
In order to explain how Baltic ports are affected by the new regulations and how they
adapt to these changes, the analysis cannot be reduced to the simplistic scheme of ‘regula-
tor → regulated’, but must embrace the complexity of the process. The use of interactive
governance as a research framework has several advantages in this respect. Firstly, it fo-
cuses on the empirical research into dynamic action (governing interaction) rather than
static structures (government institutions). Secondly, it makes no normative assumptions
about the actors, so that the scope of governing actors is defined empirically for each con-
crete case. Thirdly, it does not impose any methodological restrictions, being open to
quantitative, formal and qualitative contributions alike. Finally, although the policy
process in question can be formally regarded as a new regulation which targets vessels
and requires them to technically adjust to the new sulphur exhaust limits, the interactive
approach emphasizes the governance dimension of this process. At the same time, this
analytical strategy is not without limitations. The concepts of the interactive governance
approach offer a rather simplistic research model to deliver an analysis of this process, be-
cause in the actual process of SOx emissions reductions, all the dimensions of governance
are interconnected and influence each other so that the causes and effects are often diffi-
cult to distinguish between. Thus no tools are provided for recognising the direction of
causality and the actor-structure problem remains unresolved.
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Sulphur reduction: governing actors
The mechanisms associated with SOx emissions reduction, such as monitoring, certifi-
cation, control and penalisation, as well as the provision of additional services, relies on
multiple actors with different and often conflicting agendas. The logic of the interactive
governance approach suggests that the question “Who is the governing actor?” is em-
pirically open. The initial monitoring of the data showed that both public and private
bodies consider their interests affected and therefore are concerned with the upcoming
changes in shipping SOx emissions standards (Table 1). Additionally, the exploration
focuses upon the actor’s position in governance interaction, distinguishing between
rule-demanders, rule- suppliers and targets of rules (Buethe 2010). This framework al-
lows for a systematic approach to identification of positions of governing actors. Im-
portantly, it highlights the changing relationship between actors in the development of
governance processes.
Nation states are usually considered as the main rule-demanders, since they have rep-
resentatives in the intergovernmental organizations (such as the International Maritime
Organisation - IMO), through which they seek to formally regulate the negative envir-
onmental effects of shipping. In the Baltic Sea region, the Helsinki Commission
(HELCOM) has a key role in environmental protection and policymaking through
intergovernmental cooperation (Stankiewicz 2012), although bringing the divergent in-
terests of the Baltic littoral states together is not always possible (Knutsen and Hassler
2011; Hassler 2011). The EU institutions (the European Commission and the European
Parliament) are now increasingly active in demanding new environmental regulations
as well as attempting to introduce rules for exceeding the level of demands posed by
the states in the IMO debates. In EU policymaking, issues related to public health and
the environment are lobbied for by the interest groups through the Directorate General
Environment, although there are often conflicts of interest with the maritime andTable 1 Actors and their roles in sulphur emission reduction process (own compilation)
Actor Function/regulatory domain/governance role
Inter-governmental organizations: International Maritime
Organization (IMO), Helsinki Commission (HELCOM)
Resolutions and recommendations
The European Union (EU), European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA)
Sulphur directive 1999/32, clean shipping projects,
enforcement, monitoring and control
Nation states Acting as ‘flag’, ‘port’ and ‘coastal’ states in terms of
regulatory and implementation capacity
Private regulators (marine insurers, P&I clubs, classification
societies)
Monitoring and ensuring that the regulation in
place is obeyed
Ship owners and their industry associations (e.g. ECSA &
associations at national level)
Targets of the rules, increasing demanders of
change and rule-suppliers (e.g. Clean Ship Project)
Cargo-owners (consignors) and associations representing
their interests
Actors in supply chain, increasingly rule-demanders
Ports and their associations (European Sea Port
Organization, Baltic Port Organization)
Mixed role both as a market player and potential
facilitator
Shipbuilding industry, manufacturers and suppliers of
scrubber technology
Market interests at stake
Producers & suppliers of fuels, bunkering companies Market interests at stake
NGOs and civil society Environmental pressure – not very strong in the
case of SOx emissions reduction
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Transport (Pallis 2007). Thus, both intergovernmental organizations and EU institu-
tions are arenas in which different interests within maritime transport meet each other.
At the same time, the role of environmental NGOs, which played a prominent role in
demanding new rules and regulations in other issue-areas, has been rather marginal in
the maritime issues (Skovgaard 2012), especially concerning the SOx questions.
The private actors can be expected to occupy the target-of-rules position in govern-
ance. In the Baltic Sea region, ship and cargo-owners and associations representing
their interests continually complain about a sharp rise in vessel operation costs caused
by the sulphur regulations (Sweco 2012; field notes). Also in the bunkering sector, espe-
cially in Russia, SOx regulation was received most negatively, due to fears of significant
shrinkage of the market and loss of market shares (PortNews 2013). However, the Bal-
tic maritime industry is not homogeneous in its reactions to SOx regulation. A small
group of environmentally-minded ship owners (e.g. Wallenius Wilhelmsen, Maersk)
have already adopted voluntary measures to implement new regulations in order to
gain a positive image (Maersk 2011; Wallenius 2013). Others have started to invest in
adaptation strategies well in advance; e.g. by transferring their vessels to liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) (Izvestiya 2012). Demand for additional measures comes also from a
group of cargo-owners willing to transport their goods with a vessel which adheres to
environmental quality standards. Since documentation from a classification society re-
lates only to upholding the minimum standards, ship owners turn to ISO certification
or private certification schemes to prove their environmental quality. In the BSR, one
of the prominent voluntary certification schemes used for notifying environmental
quality which goes beyond regulation is the Clean Shipping Index (CSI) (CSP 2012;
Wuisan et al. 2012). The CSI was created to improve the environmental performance
of maritime transport and to bring together like-minded vessel and cargo owners. After
fulfilling the requirements of the Index, the vessel-owners receive authorization for
their vessels from a classification society. Cargo-owners in turn can use the CSI mem-
bers in their procurement of transport services, to assure their own customers that they
only use companies with good environmental performance. In addition, a Clean Ship-
ping Forum, which other supply chain actors such as freight forwarders and ports can
join, has been created. Engaging in such schemes as CSI, ship and cargo owners change
their position with regard to governance interaction.
Multiple contexts of the emission reduction process
The interactive governance framework suggests that the institutional context shapes
the governing interactions. Thus, it is beneficial to study how actors relate to the con-
text. In order to analyzing the assumed actions and intentions of the actors, we relied
on a broad desk-top study of publicly available materials to reconstruct the broad lines
of the multiple contexts in which the debate on SOx unfolds. At this stage, qualitative
content analysis allowed for identifying how the actors relate to the context and how
the particularities of the context shape actors cost-and-benefit calculations with regard
to the expected outcomes. When the research was consolidated, we recognized a need
to enlarge the contextual analysis beyond the shipping arena and consider the regional
governance patterns. In particular, we pinpointed the differences in debates on the SOx
emissions which unfolded among the EU and Russian maritime stakeholders. The
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appeared very strong through the source materials.
Regulatory context The IMO and the EU, the rule-suppliers regarding SOx emissions
reduction, have moved forward with the issue with a different timetable and on a differ-
ent geographical scale. The IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee adopted
amendments to the MARPOL Annex VI regulations on sulphur oxide requiring a max-
imum 3.50% content by 1 January 2012 and 0.50%, by 1 January 2020 globally. As com-
ing to an agreement on global SOx levels turned out problematic, sulphur emission
control areas (SECAs) were formed. These consisted of: Baltic and North Sea, North
American SECA and Japan-East Asia SECA. The transposition of provisions set under
the IMO into the system of EU law has had important consequences. Firstly, the exist-
ence of an EU directive gives the Commission a degree of competence in this area,
which means that the member States are supposed to give an agreed position at the
IMO for all matters concerning the sulphur content in liquid fuels. Secondly, a direct-
ive is the most prescriptive instrument in the EU legislative tool-kit. It has the features
of direct applicability and direct effect, making the implementation and enforcement
more detailed and rigorous than the provisions of international law. Moreover, this dir-
ective is applicable on a territorial basis, so that any foreign vessel (i.e. not sailing one
of the EU Member States flags) also falls under the scope of its provisions when enter-
ing the coastal waters and ports of the EU countries. Additionally, the geography of the
Baltic Sea and its shipping routes make it practically impossible for vessels to avoid
sailing in EU coastal waters, even if their target ports are located in Russia. Thus, the
EU sulphur directive de facto has a wider scope (of actors included). Moreover, in the
IMO, practices of lobbying for delays, individual opt-outs and special schedules are
widespread, although the EU Commission has refused to revise the directive’s schedule.
Finally, EU law adds a private liability dimension to IMO rules, whereas private entities
cannot be penalized for non-compliance with IMO public international law. Further-
more, the EU decided to take additional actions and in its transposition set even tighter
limits. The EU directive 1999/32 limited the ship fuel sulphur content to 0.1% in 2015
in the Baltic Sea and North Sea SECA area. Non-compliance with the directive is to be
penalized by the national authorities. However, checks on the amount of fuel in ships
were made very loosely, which raised concerns among NGOs that the failure to comply
will not always be discovered (Transport and Environment. Newsroom 2012).
These legal inconsistencies have direct implications for the functioning of ports. In
compliance with MARPOL Annex VI a regulatory system based upon Air Pollution
Prevention Certificates emerged. The Certificates are applied by shipping firms owning
and/or operating vessels from respective national agencies (e.g. maritime administra-
tion), which verifies the compliance of vessels of its nationality with measures falling
under the scope of air pollution reduction (engine modifications, supply of low-sulphur
bunker etc.). Neither the IMO nor the EU regulations lay down detailed provisions on
sulphur legislation enforcement. The states are responsible both as flag and port states
for the successful implementation of the regulation. Thus, the role of inspector is re-
served for ports, which in the framework of port State control (PSC) procedures veri-
fies the vessel’s compliance based on the vessel’s certificate as prima face evidence. If a
vessel is found to be non-compliant, compliance and enforcement mechanisms (e.g.
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pliance) can be triggered. A similar situation emerges if a vessel chooses to adhere to the
IMO sulphur regulations by installing a scrubber, which requires a retrofit plan, with dead-
lines and approval by class or flag state. Classification societies need to inspect a vessel and
state whether the scrubber is fully functional. Thereafter, ports come into action, since the
scrubber installation is monitored by PSC authorities during a PSC inspection. Therefore,
controlling function of ports in respect to monitoring the implementation of sulphur fuel
reduction (inspecting, sampling, prosecuting) is central, even though the regulatory environ-
ment is ambiguous in respect to implementation of this function.
“Environment vs. economy” context Even though air emissions represent only a part
of the negative shipping externalities, the issue is significant for several reasons. The
shipping industry accounts for approximately 10-15% of NOx (nitrogen oxides) and 4-9%
of SOx emissions globally (Endresen et al. 2008). Sulphur in ship fuels lead to declining
air quality, and creates negative health effects for humans and unwanted acidic loads in
the environment. Sulphur in fuels is transformed into sulphur oxides after a burning
process producing the key component of the particle matters (PM). Therefore, the regula-
tion of the SOx content in a bunker is an effective way to contribute to limiting the ad-
verse health effects of ship exhausts (Jalkanen et al. 2009). The concerns related to the
negative effects of sulphur emissions on public health and the deterioration of the marine
and coastal environment were, for the regional maritime stakeholders, the main reason
for bringing the vessel fuel issue into the realm of public policy. At the same time, many
indicated that the decision to introduce regulation was premature and warned of the po-
tential negative environmental effects connected to modal shifts from sea to rail and road
(field notes).
The choices regarding fuel vessel use is a significant driving force for changing future
transport flows because fuel costs represents between 45 to 55% of the daily operational
costs of vessels. The proposed SOx regulations are expected to raise the costs of ship-
ping between 30 to 50% (Kalli et al. 2009; EMSA 2010). Ship and cargo-owners and
their associations point out that, as a result of SOx regulations, freight prices will in-
crease; since additional costs will be allocated to charter parties. Export industries par-
ticularly fear a significant increase in sea freight prices (with up to 1.2 billion Euro
additional costs per year), which in turn can negatively affect their competitiveness.
Many industry associations have lobbied to postpone the introduction of stricter
sulphur emission standards by 5 to 10 years (Sweco 2012; Forest Industries, Swedish
Forest Industries Federation 2012; EK 2011). Ship and cargo owners expressed objec-
tions towards the EU Sulphur Directive 2012/33/EU because it sets tighter limits for
vessels operating inside the IMO SECA areas as compared to other waters under the
jurisdiction of EU member states, creating an uneven playing field within the EU. They
proposed that either another SECA should be formed to cover the Mediterranean Sea,
or that, alternatively, compensation measures should be offered for those vessels oper-
ating inside the presently established SECAs in order to equalize the differences in op-
eration costs (CEPI 2012; Maritime 2012; Yle Uutiset 2012).
Also, in the bunkering sector, serious concerns were shown, in particular by the
Russian bunkering industry. In 2011 the Russian Association of Marine and River
Bunkerers held an annual forum, in which a petition was prepared and later sent to the
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ment to ‘Problem 2015′ (SRO RAMRB 2012). The main concerns of the bunkering in-
dustry are (1) the inability to supply a sufficient amount of compliant fuel due to lack
of necessary refinement capabilities in the Russian oil industry; (2) the shrinkage of the
bunker market, particularly of the transit bunkering segment; (3) the absence of stan-
dards, equipment and infrastructure for a wide introduction of LNG bunkering in
Russian ports. The main competitive advantage of the Russian bunkering market has
been lower prices for heavy fuel oil (HFO), which created a constant growth of ca. 10%
due to a gradual increase in transit bunkering. As regards new sulphur regulations,
the bunkering industry appealed to both rising costs connected to adjustment
(modernization of old and acquisition of new equipment for refining and bunkering),
decreasing incomes connected to loss of competitiveness with foreign companies, and a
drop in number of vessels bunkering in Russian ports. In the worst case scenario, the
prognosis for Russian bunkering market shrinkage is up to 40% (Morskoy 2012b;
Morskoy 2012d). The Russian ship owners fear that they will have to use more expen-
sive low-sulphur fuel due to the absence of sufficient LNG infrastructure (Morskoy
2012b). At the same time, the Bunkering association recognized the perspective of
LNG bunkering development as a long-term opportunity.
Finally, due to changes in the operational environment (rising freight prices, modal
shift, fuel shortages, lack of infrastructure), the traffic patterns in many ports are
expected to change. In particular, the small and middle-sized ports positioned within
the Baltic SECA are afraid of losing traffic, their main source of earnings, because grow-
ing maritime transportation costs could increase cargo transports on land or cause the
re-routing of cargo to ports outside the SECA area (PortStrategy 2011). Russian ports
which now enjoy a higher number of transit ship calls visiting for bunkering purposes
are also worried about losing their traffic (PortNews 2013). As ports with bigger vol-
umes are in a better position in terms of market shares and are more attractive for in-
vestments, from the smaller ports’ perspective the new tighter environmental regulation
will only enforce the on-going trend towards larger ports by eradicating the small ports.
Technological context Currently there are three technical ways a vessel can fulfill the
proposed emission limits: (1) by using fuels with a reduced sulphur content (marine
gas oil (MGO) or marine diesel oil (MDO)), (2) installation of a scrubber (exhaust gas
cleaning system) to a vessel, or (3) conversion of a vessel so that the use of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) or other alternative fuels is possible (Kalli et al. 2009; EMSA 2010;
Bengtson et al. 2011; Stenhede 2012). However, all these options have technical and/or
financial limitations. MGO/MDO is already available, but many ship owners restrain
from using it due to its higher price. Additionally when NOx standards come into
force, the ship owners who chose this alternative will need a new round of adjustment
measures. With a scrubber, a vessel can continue to use high sulphur bunker, but a
scrubber costs several million euros and installation is not technically possible for all
vessel types. Scrubbers also produce sludge and washing waters that cannot be put into
the Balticsea. Ports thus need to have reception facilities for this material from vessels
(Kalli et al. 2009; Wärtsilä 2010). Even though the suppliers of the scrubbers are very
optimistic regarding the effectiveness of their technology, in the opinion of the ship
owners/operators the scrubbers currently offered on the market are not reliable enough
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munication 20.9.2012, Morskoy 2012a). The use of LNG can solve many environmental
problems, as it naturally contains no sulphur and the emission caused by LNG used as
a fuel are lower compared to other fuels (EMSA 2010). However, LNG is not a panacea
either: vessels need to be converted and terminals suitable for LNG bunkering are re-
quired. Also the lack of operational standards produces multiple safety, security and en-
vironmental concerns, hindering LNG usage (Aagesen 2012). Thus, what investments
into infrastructure and facilities will be needed in terms of port adaptation is yet un-
clear. Shipbuilding industry, manufacturers and suppliers of scrubber technology, as
well as producers and suppliers of new marine fuels all have the knowledge to support
emission reductions from the technical side, i.e. they possess the expertise necessary to
create realistic and efficient rules. At the same time, these actors all have market inter-
ests at stake: new SOx standards mean increasing business opportunities for them –
and increasing competition.
Whereas the introduction of SOx regulation brings the ports new responsibilities as
rule-suppliers since the responsibility to monitor and control compliance is held by the
port state authorities, it also makes ports to a target for rules about infra- and super-
structure development and maintenance. Ports become responsible for enabling cleaner
operations via the establishment and maintenance of reception facilities (for scrubber
wastewaters and sludge), LNG infrastructure (storages, bunkering terminals) and
shore-side electricity facilities. For many Baltic ports and their associations, these
changes constitute a major concern (Holma and Kajander 2012), since long-term in-
vestment decisions in which ports are dependent on the choices of other actors need to
be made.
Regional governance context The regional governance context adds an important di-
mension to our understanding of the Baltic ports’ operational environment. The SOx
emission reduction has an immediate connection with the energy policy agenda, since
it directly concerns energy efficiency, the choice of fuels and their supply. In particular,
the question of fuel availability and price poses challenges to ship owners, who have to
adjust their vessels and ensure compliance with new exhaust standards. Which adjust-
ment alternative will turn out to be the best economic solution depends on the dispos-
ition of forces in Baltic energy markets. So, besides the economic costs, the political
costs of adaptation need to be accounted for.
In the Baltic Sea Region, energy questions are high on the political agenda. Thus, the
patterns of Baltic regional governance necessarily influence the port adaptation strat-
egies in the SOx emission reduction process. The recent development of the system of
Baltic maritime governance was marked by EU attempt to widen its influence in inter-
national maritime affairs (Gritsenko 2013). The proliferating EU competences (as in
case with the Sulphur Directive) put limitations on the strategies available to the
Russian maritime industry. In particular, the Russian bunkering market is concerned
about consequences of SOx regulation.
Each of the technological options required to meet the SOx requirements has a dif-
ferent meaning for the bunkering market. If the ship owners choose the MDO/MGO
option, the bunkering companies need to increase their supply of these fuels. Bunkering
constitutes 0.3-0.5% of Russian GDP. Nearly 80% of the fuel supply is HFO, which for
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2012d). Although up to 70% of the fuels the Russian bunkering companies supply to
the BSR are bunkers with low-sulphur content (1%), this fuel will not be useable when
the 0.1% limit comes into force in 2015. Currently these companies do not offer any
fuel which is near the 0.1% limit, so a switch to MGO/MDO is unavoidable. The major-
ity, ca. 70% (Morskoy 2012b) of Russian bunker suppliers are daughter companies of
vertically integrated oil and gas companies, including Rosneft and RN-Bunker,
Gazprom and GazpromNeft Marine Bunker, Lukoil and LUKOIL-Bunker, as well as the
pipeline companies Transneft and Transneft-Servis. The rest consist of smaller inde-
pendent bunkering companies (e.g. Baltic Fuel Company, Baltiyskaya Toplivnaya
Kompaniya) which buy fuel from oil majors instead of producing it themselves. Thus,
the dominant Russian bunkering companies, which are bound to their own production
schedules, have started to produce marine diesel oil, which requires costly investment
in the refinery and production processes. Eventually, maritime stakeholders assume
upcoming modal shifts due to shortage of compliant fuels and/or rising fuel prices in
Russian ports.
In case scrubber technology is chosen, Russian bunker companies and the oil indus-
try can proceed with a ‘business as usual’ scenario, in which they are capable of supply-
ing HFO at competitive prices. However, they cannot assess the scrubber option as the
‘first-choice’ alternative due to multiple technical issues which still remain unsolved
(Izvestiya 2012). As for the LNG option, the opinions in Russian maritime sectors are
divided: some see it as the future alternative (Izvestiya 2012; Morskoy 2012a), some are
sceptical due to the required infrastructure investment (Morskoy 2012a,b; Morskaya
2011). The EU is widely supporting and developing the idea of LNG-fueled European
fleet (European Commission 2013). Russian gas supply capabilities are excellent, so the
interests of the EU and Russian LNG suppliers meet. However, extensive use of LNG
requires development of (1) a regulatory basis for LNG use; (2) new building and retro-
fitting; (3) LNG infrastructure (production, storage, bunkering terminals etc.) which are
all costly procedures and will take a long time to implement (Morskoy 2012c, SRO
RAMRB 2012; Morskoy 2012b). In this case, the EU will have a competitive advantage.
Statoil is leading the Nordic market for LNG bunkering, while many liquefying facilities
are situated in Europe, so that Russian gas transported via pipelines can be liquefied
and supplied as fuel by European producers. Since the Russian gas industry is monopo-
lized by the state-owned Gazprom, Russian ports are afraid of losing their traffic in case
the federal state will not help them to adjust, modernize and develop costly LNG infra-
structure (Morskoy 2012c). Another solution for Russian ports would be to engage in
closer cooperation with the EU partners to ensure sound development of LNG facil-
ities. The economic viability of this solution can be undermined by the political situ-
ation, since it touches upon the sensitive field of EU-Russian energy relations. Thus,
the advances in Baltic maritime governance are closely bound to the broader agenda of
EU-RF relations (Gritsenko 2013).
Summary
Though SOx regulation targets vessels, our analysis has shown that, in the emission re-
duction process, the role of the Baltic ports will change. The ports will gain new con-
trolling functions, but new operational requirements will also be imposed. Stevedore
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other actors interact and carry out their operations within a port. On behalf of the
ports, the tightening of environmental regulations is a threat to competitiveness. Before
a port can become an enabling environment for environmental shipping, the required
port infrastructure has to be built. In order to finance such changes, ship-owners (via
duties and fees) can be involved, or ports can invest their own resources or find inves-
tors among the third parties (nation states, EU funds, private investors). However,
whereas larger ports might have more resources to pay for new facilities and better op-
portunities to manage co-financed schemes, smaller ports often lack resources and feel
that their competitiveness is threatened. Many operators of small and medium sized
ports are thus worried, because the operational costs of shipping are constantly increas-
ing, while earnings are not (Stubbe 2012).
Whereas some ports have concerns about their survival after 2015 when the IMO
sulphur regulation enters into force, and are trying to calculate what it would mean for
their traffic volumes, other ports in the BSR have actively started looking for available
options. Examples include collaborative agreements between ports to ensure cleaner
shipping. The Ports of Stockholm and the Port of Helsinki have cooperated in environ-
mental issues since 2009. The Ports of Stockholm and the Port of Turku signed a col-
laborative agreement in 2011 to improve the environment in the Baltic Sea. The ports
collaborate in facilitating the use of LNG for vessel fuel and for enabling LNG bunker-
ing in both ports, by investigating the possibilities of supply electricity from the shore
to more vessels operating with frequent liner schedules, and the management of grey
and black water (The Ports of Stockholm 2011). All three ports (Stockholm, Helsinki
and Turku) share the same shipping lines. By collaborating with the shipping line, the
ports made preparations for the new vessel ‘Grace’, which uses LNG. The vessel started
sailing on the Turku-Stockholm route in January 2013 (Viking Line 2013a,b). Other ex-
amples include the establishment of collaborative networks. Currently, nine Baltic ports
(Aarhus, Helsingborg, Helsinki, Malmö-Copenhagen, Tallinn, Turku, Stockholm,
Sczcecin-Zwinoujscie and Riga) together with ship owners, LNG companies, national
port organisations and European Seaports Organisation (ESPO) work together to en-
able LNG bunkering for vessels in the Baltic ports (TEN-T EA, Trans-European Trans-
port Network Executive Agency 2012).This project highlights the facilitating role of
ports in shipping governance process: the ports facilitate the investment, give land and
make the necessary investments for the vessels (e.g. new quays). The port authorities
also make a concession with a gas infrastructure company/gas operator to build and
operate the LNG terminal. The project is TEN-T funded (Oldakowski 2012).
New shipping environmental standards can also bring business opportunities to
ports. By virtue of their connectivity function, ports occupy a unique position precisely
due to the fact that they constitute governance arenas which are inhabited by a large
number of actors involved in transport and supply chains. This opens up possibilities of
stewardship, new leadership and reputational gains. While tightening environmental
regulation is currently seen as a threat to connectivity, it can also be a source of com-
petitive advantage. Some shipping companies and cargo owners have already realized
this, with regard to the increasing adoption of voluntary regulations such as the Clean
Shipping Index (CSP 2012; Wuisan et al. 2012). Broadening the range of stakeholders
and explicating the responsible parties (not only in terms of liability, but also in terms
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tions within the global supply chain (Ponte and Gibbon 2006; Lloyd’s Register 2011;
Pike et al. 2011).
Baltic ports: adapting to a complex environment
Ports cannot be considered as ‘newcomers’ in the domain of shipping externalities gov-
ernance, given their role in monitoring and control granted by the PSC mechanism.
However, the governance of shipping externalities is becoming a polycentric and multi-
leveled process, which requires venues where actors can meet communicate and create
structures in which different governance mechanisms can complement each other. This
strengthens the role of ports as a place (Olivier and Slack 2006; Verhoeven 2010) which
can naturally offer themselves as venues due to their physical properties (prominently
as waterfronts and logistic nodes) as well as their environmental stewardship in the
course of the greening of maritime sector. On the other hand, this requires ports to
adapt new strategies, which will allow them to function in a situation of multiple
conflicting contexts, which can create uncertainties in their operational environment.
The first empirical research questions asked how SOx emission reduction policies are
being anticipated by maritime industry, in particular by the Baltic ports. On the basis of
our analysis, we defined two strategies which Baltic ports are likely to adopt in order to
adjust to upcoming changes: (1) preventing loss of traffic by creating compliance-
friendly infrastructures (ports themselves bear the cost of adaptation or find external
investment); (2) raising the attractiveness of shipping as environmentally-friendly trans-
port (e.g., in the light of CSR, cost of adaptation is transferred on the other actors)
(Figure 1, right hand side). These strategies are not universal, but constitute responses
to the possible future scenarios (chains of events expected to happen) emerging in the
process of multi-stakeholder interaction and shaping ports’ operational environment. As
demonstrated above, when pursuing these strategies, ports can act as environmental
leaders to promote change, as coordinators of multi-stakeholder processes, as well as
cooperating with other ports.
The ‘mind-map’ of the stakeholders’ debate on the SOx reduction process presents
their views of the process, mapping conflicting contexts in terms of opportunities and
threats (Figure 1, left hand side). This brings together the analysis of governing actors,
institutions, which structure their interaction, and conflicts between the different insti-
tutional contexts, within which the SOx debate unfolds. At the initial stage, most actors
feared the upcoming changes. However, these changes do not necessarily have a nega-
tive impact on the maritime sector, or on the competitiveness and connectivity of ports.
Changes occurring in ports, along with the proliferation of SOx emission reduction
procedures, illustrate how these concerns are anticipated in the BSR.
The second empirical research question seeks to clarify how port adaptation strat-
egies are tied in with Baltic local and energy contexts. At the same time, the strategies
described above include benefits and challenges which are inherently connected to the
broader socio-political context of the BSR. Within the Baltic Sea region, there is still an
East–west divide regarding the actors’ willingness and capacity to take on environmen-
tally related investments. For example, public awareness about forming political atti-
tudes and consumer pressure demands that such investments are higher in the Nordic
countries and Germany compared to the Baltic States or Poland. Germany and Nordic
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economic investments, and an indication of this is eco-innovation performance (Weber
et al. 2012). Practically-oriented projects between ports could diminish this divide by
facilitating best practices. Secondly, we need to account for energy issues: also emission
reduction from shipping is a question of energy policy, which requires choice and
changes in the energy markets. This means that the vulnerable energy policy balance in
the BSR, which is dominated by the EU-RF relation in this area, also has to be taken
into account.
As the Figure 1 indicates, the interaction of multiple stakeholders defines the struc-
ture of the ports’ operational environment, which in turn influences the positions the
ports assume in the governance process, and also defines their alternatives against the
overall cost-opportunity structure. Moreover, the process is nested within the wider
patterns of regional governance. The ports’ adaptation strategies in the Baltic do not
necessarily reflect the alternatives, which will be met by ports in other regions. Taking
into consideration the transboundary and globalized character of the modern maritime
industry, our results show how different governance patterns may emerge in different
regions with regard to the same ‘universal’ international regulations. This again explains
why the hierarchical regulatory governance of shipping through negative externalities
fails and why polycentricity needs to be taken into account when shipping is
concerned.
Conclusions
Using an interactive governance approach, this study has reconstructed the process of
SOx emissions reduction in the Baltic Sea region as a complex multi-stakeholder inter-
action. In particular, it has paid attention to how governing interactions are embedded
within local socio-political and energy contexts. The empirical investigation has
demonstrated that the adaptation process is not limited to developing governance
mechanisms capable of incorporating technical solutions in order to reduce negative
impacts. Adapting to the changes in their operational environment, actors pursued new
strategies, defined new rules and norms, but also reinterpreted the old institutions to
reinforce their governance positions. This explains how seemingly universal inter-
national maritime regulations can produce varying patterns of governance.
Observing the process of adaptation of the Baltic ports, this article highlights the
importance of how to create governance structures capable of reducing the institutional
ambiguities and resolving the problems of collective action. The case study showed the
major limitation of a ‘technological fix’ – its ignorance regarding the divergent interests
of multiple actors at different levels and scales – which dismisses SOx emissions from
any other policy arena rather than pollution reduction. However, the issue of low-
sulphur shipping appears far more complex, since no single actor has the full authority
and capability to implement it. The mechanisms which are activated to limit the SOx
emissions from seagoing vessels, such as monitoring, certification, control and penal-
ization, as well as service-provision, rely on multiple actors with different and
conflicting agendas, which are disseminated within the polycentric shipping governance
arena. Thus, the article claims that globalized shipping industry is inherently polycen-
tric and that the local and sectoral embeddedness of these multiple centers of authority
needs to be taken into account.
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shipping challenges the traditional forms of port involvement in shipping governance,
requiring changes in port administration and management. The introduction of SOx
regulation broadens the ways in which of stakeholders are affected by the changes in
shipping standards. However, this de facto change was not structurally anticipated by
the introduction of comprehensive strategies for the management of shipping practices.
Thus, many actors were forced into creating ad hoc and temporary solutions. Given the
high degree of interdependence between the optimal strategies, the operational context
has remained uncertain. The lack of clarity in terms of SOx adaptation strategies not only
has economic but also political consequences, which have to be taken into account when
planning how to transfer to zero-waste zero-emission shipping. In this study, we particu-
larly suggest paying more attention to the position of ports in the process and their poten-
tial role in reducing the ambiguities and resolving the problems of collective action.
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